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Risky decisions are at the core of economic theory. While many of these decisions 
are taken on behalf of others rather than for oneself, the existing literature finds 
mixed results on whether people take more or less risk for others then for themselves. 
Recent studies suggest that taking decisions for others reduces loss aversion, thereby 
increasing risk taking on behalf of others. To test this, we elicit loss aversion in three 
treatments: making risky decisions for oneself, for one other subject, or for the 
decision maker and another person combined. We find a clear treatment effect when 
making decisions for others but not when making decisions for both. 
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1. Introduction 
Standard decision theory mainly considers individual decision processes in which the decision maker is 
the only affected person by his decisions. However, the majority of financial decisions affects not only the 
decision maker himself but also others, e.g. investments on financial markets usually have to be made via a 
Andersson et al. (2014) argue that loss aversion plays a 
role when making risky decision for others. They hypothesize that people take higher risks for others due to 
a reduced loss aversion. The theoretical background stems from the dual-process model of decision making 
(Kahneman, 2003; Rustichini, 2008) in which decisions taken for others differ in the weighting of emotional 
and cognitive components involved. Using data from an online experiment with a large number of subjects 
randomly drawn from the general Danish population, Andersson et al. (2014) conclude that loss aversion 
indeed is reduced when subjects make decisions for others. The conclusion is derived from a structural 
model assuming a constant relative risk-aversion utility function with a kink at zero. However, non-
parametric tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal loss aversion levels when comparing decision 
making for self or for others. Hence, it is unclear whether a treatment effect exists when considering other 
model specifications. In particular the CRRA model has been shown to have only a very limited predictive 
power regarding the observed behavior in experiments (Friedman et al., 2014). Instead, Vieider et al. (2016) 
consider a broader experimental setup making use of structural models based on prospect theory (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992) including probability weighting functions. Only under specifications identical to those 
of Andersson et al. (2014), Vieider et al. (2016) are able to replicate the result concerning the effect of loss 
aversion. For other specifications, however, they fail to find significant differences. Vieider et al. (2016) 
conclude that a clear loss aversion affect cannot be verified as it depends crucially on the definition adopted 
in the setup of the structural model. Hence, the literature on decision making for others has so far not 
provided convincing evidence for the loss aversion effect (see Füllbrunn and Luhan (2015) for a general 
overview).  
We aim to clarify this issue. In contrast to the above mentioned papers, we directly elicit loss aversion 
levels using an established procedure discussed in detail by Gächter et al. (2010) (see references and proofs 
therein). In a between-subjects design, we implement three treatments reflecting Andersson et al. (2014) 
and Vieider et al. (2016). In treatment Self, each subject makes a decision for herself. In Aligned, each 
subject makes the same decision for herself AND for a randomly drawn subject in the laboratory. In Others, 
each subject makes a decision for a randomly drawn participant in the laboratory without consequences for 
the decision maker. If loss aversion plays a role, then the loss aversion level should be higher in Self than in 
either Aligned or in Others. 
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Our results show that loss aversion levels are indeed higher in Self than in Others. We do not find such 
an effect comparing Self and Aligned though.  
2. Procedure 
In line with Gächter et al. (2010), individuals decided for each of six lotteries whether they want to accept 
or reject it. The price in case of a success is fixed at six euro in each lottery, the loss varied between two 
and seven euro. At the end of the experiment, one lottery was randomly determined for the payoff. In a 
between-subjects design, we consider the three treatments Self, Aligned, and Others as described above. 
Figure 1 reproduces the decisions for all treatments. The only treatment difference is the wording, i.e. 
Self Aligned
Others.  
FIGURE 1. TASK ACCEPT OR REJECT LOTTERIES
We implemented the experiment as follows. Upon arrival, the participants received a one page instruction 
including the receipt already featuring a ten euro show-up fee.3 The experimenter read out the instructions 
aloud and asked participants to fill in their name, the date, and also their signature on the receipt. The 
participants turned the page to find treatment specific instructions. The program was started and the decision 
screen appeared. Now the experimenter read the second page of the instructions and asked for questions. 
Due to the simple instructions, almost no questions were asked and participants started to enter their 
decisions on screen. After making their decisions, the participants filled in a questionnaire eliciting 
demographics, risk aversion (Dohmen et al., 2011) and a social responsibility score (Berkowitz & 
Lutterman, 1968).4 After the questionnaire, the participants learned the lottery-result and their payoff 
3 The full paper and on-screen instructions can be found in the appendix. 
4 Find details in Füllbrunn and Luhan (2015).
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(positive or negative) from the experiment. Participants were paid privately and in cash before leaving the 
laboratory.  
In Aligned, two participants were matched after the decision stage and the program randomly determined 
one decision to be implemented for both participants. In Others, the software randomly chose participant i
to make the decision for participant j, j to make the decision for k and so on. Matching was done 
anonymously and no interaction took place between the participants.  
We ran the experiments at the NSM Decision Lab at Radboud University in Nijmegen (NL) and at the 
strateGiX lab at Rhine Waal University of Applied Science in Kleve (D) right across the border. In 
Nijmegen, subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) while in Kleve subject were recruited using 
hroot (Bock et al., 2014). We programmed the experiment in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We ran several 
sessions yielding a total of 53 decisions (33 NL/20 D) in Self, 49 decisions (29/20) in Aligned, and 40 
decisions (21/19) in Others 5  Each session lasted about 20 minutes and the average earnings were 10.32 
euro (SD 3.62). As we find no significant difference across subject pools after treatment comparisons (see 
appendix), we merge the subject pools in the upcoming analysis.  
3. Results 
In line with the literature (e.g. Gächter et al., 2010), we consider only subjects with monotonic acceptance 
decisions (88 percent). The loss aversion proxy is thus the number of rejected lotteries (7=reject all, 6=accept 
only #1, 5=accept only #1 and #2, ..., 1=accept all) with 7 meaning highly loss averse. Figure 2 displays 
violin plots together with p-values from non-parametric tests.  
5 Differences are due to no-shows. 
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FIGURE 2. VIOLIN PLOTS NUMBER OF REJECTED LOTTERIES
While the figure indicates no difference between Self and Aligned (same median, same interquartile 
ranges, almost similar density functions) it indicates a clear difference between Self and Others (lower 
median, lower 75% quartile, right skewed density function). The two tests show no difference between Self
and Aligned (p>0.2) but a significant difference between Self and Others (p<0.001, Post-hoc power 0.71 
using G*Power from Faul et al., (2007)), i.e. the number rejected is lower in Others than in Self. 
The Poisson regressions in Table 1, with the number of lotteries rejected as the dependent variable, two 
treatment dummies and additional controls as independent variables, support the results from the non-
parametric tests (for details see appendix). The Others dummy is significantly negative in the model with 
and without controls; subjects in Others reject on average one lottery less than in Self. In contrast, the dummy 
for treatment Aligned is not significant. 
TABLE 1 POISSON REGRESSION: NUMBER OF REJECTED LOTTERIES
 Aligned Others Constant N Wald  Prob. < Controls
Model 1 -0.095 
(0.070) 
-0.20 
(0.073)** 
1.43 
(0.044)***
125 8.0133 0.0182 No 
Model 2 -0.093 
(0.055) 
-0.20 
(0.068)** 
1.55 
(0.03)*** 
125 75.4095 <0.0001 Yes 
Notes: Poisson regressions with the number of rejected lotteries as dependent variable. Main variables of interests are the treatment dummies Aligned 
and Others. Controls include a location dummy (Nijmegen, Kleve), a dummy for economics students, a female dummy, age, the social responsibility 
score, and general risk. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Assuming cumulative prospect theory, the implied loss aversion for each loss level L is 
 with the weighting function  and the value function  in the gain (+) 
and loss ( ) domain. In line with Gächter et al. (2010), we take into account different benchmarks for these 
functions, i.e.  or  for the weighing functions, and 
 or  for sensitivity. Applying these benchmarks yield similar lambdas 
for Self and Aligned (Median for the four parameter constellations: 1.50, 1.53, 1.30, and 1.32) which are 
quite close to Gächter et al. (2010). However, the lambdas are significantly lower in Others (1.20, 1.25, 
1.04, and 1.08) than in Self, indicating a lower loss aversion for others (see appendix for more details). 
4. Conclusion 
Using an established elicitation tool for loss aversion, we find clear evidence that decision makers show 
lower loss aversion when making decision for others than when making decision for themselves. However, 
this is true when making decision for others only, and not when payoffs are aligned. Our results are robust 
to changes of empirically observed prospect theory parameters.  
Comparing to Andersson et al. (2014), in particular our Table 1 to their Table 2, we find lower loss 
aversion for others only when the decision bears no consequences for the decision maker. When payoffs are 
aligned, we find no difference in loss aversion. We mirror the findings of Vieider et al. (2016) who only 
considered Aligned but not Others in that there is no difference between Self and Aligned. These differences 
in the defin once including, once excluding the decision maker appears to be 
the reason for the mixed results in the previous literature. Given our results, it would be interesting to see 
whether Vieider et al. (2016) with a richer set of structured estimations than Andersson et al. (2014) come 
to the same conclusion-the difference between Self and Others-when they use their experimental setup but 
with Others instead of with Aligned.  
Our results indicate that responsibility for other people plays a limited role for the loss aversion in 
financial decisions as long as the decision maker bears the consequences as well.  
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Appendix 
to Füllbrunn and Luhan - Decision making for others: The case of Loss Aversion 
Additional Tables and Tests 
Appendix Table 1, shows the number of monotone observations used in the analysis (first 
number) and the number of total observations (second number). In total we use 125/142=88% of 
the observations (Gächter et al., 2010  use 91%). The last two rows show p-values for tests comparing 
the two subject pools, i.e. testing the Null whether the subjects pool differ with respect to the 
number of rejected lotteries. The p-values indicate that we cannot reject the Null. Regressions 
below take the subject pool difference into account. 
 Self Aligned Others 
Obs. NL 31/33 29/29 20/21 
Obs. D 19/20 14/20 15/19 
Obs. Total 47/53 43/49 35/40 
Mann Whitney U test 0.7090 0.6493 0.4849 
Permutation test 0.7698 0.7092 0.4717 
APPENDIX TABLE 1 NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS AND SUBJECT POOL COMPARISON
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Appendix Table 2 Poisson Regression (Details for Table 1), depicts detailed regression results 
related to Table 1 in the paper.  
                   Model 1         Model 2    
Aligned        -0.095          -0.093    
                    (0.070)         (0.055)    
Others          -0.20**         -0.20**  
                      (0.073)         (0.068)    
Location                             -0.024    
                                          (0.065)    
ECON                                 0.049    
                                          (0.049)    
Female                               -0.068    
                                          (0.053)    
Age                                   -0.0017    
                                         (0.0095)    
SRS                                     0.15*   
                                          (0.061)    
Risk                                  -0.10*** 
                                          (0.014)    
Constant        1.43***         1.55*** 
                       (0.044)          (0.30)    
---------------------------------------------
------- 
No. Obs.              125             125    
Wald               8.01         75.41    
Prob <            0.018         <0.001    
APPENDIX TABLE 2 POISSON REGRESSION (Details for Table 1) 
10 
In Andersson et al. (2014), they run an analogue estimation in their table 2 and additionally 
provide a similar estimation for risk. For comparability, we do the same for the general risk measure 
(Dohmen et al., 2011). Using a simple OLS regression, we find no effect on risk as the treatment dummies 
are not significant. For risk, our results are in line with Andersson et al. (2014). 
Model 1 Model 2 
Aligned -0.032 0.045 
(0.41) (0.40) 
Others 0.055 -0.14 
(0.42) (0.42) 
Location -0.056 
(0.42) 
ECON 0.3 
(0.37) 
Female -1.22 
(0.37)***
Age 0.12 
(0.047)* 
SRS 0.19 
(0.38) 
Constant 5.66 2.9 
(0.26) (1.86) 
Obs. 125 125 
R^2 <0.001 0.123 
APPENDIX TABLE 3 ROBUST OLS REGRESSION WITH GENERAL RISK AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
(Details on independent variables see Table 1) 
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Appendix Table 4 Acceptance rates of the different lotteries in the lottery choice task and implied 
 depicts implied loss aversion levels depending on four 
different models discussed in Gächter et al. (2010) with median levels provided for each of our three 
treatments and for their data for comparison. The results show quite nicely that our results in Self 
and Aligned do not differ to results in Gächter et al. (2010). However, the results in Others differ 
significantly to the results in Self.  
Implied Loss Aversion ( ) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Implied  = 1 = .95 = 1 = 95 
Accepted = 1 = .92 = 1 = .92 
Loss  = 1 = 1 = .86 = .86 
7) Reject all lotteries  <2  >3  >2.9  >2.59  >2.51  
6) Accept #1, otherwise reject  2 3 2.9 2.59 2.51 
5) Accept #1 to #2, otherwise reject  3 2 2 1.73 1.73 
4) Accept #1 to #3, otherwise reject  4 1.5 1.53 1.3 1.32 
3) Accept #1 to #4, otherwise reject  5 1.2 1.25 1.04 1.08 
2) Accept #1 to #5, otherwise reject  6 1 1.06 0.86 0.91 
1) Accept all  7  0.86  0.92  0.74  0.79  
Median  
Self  1.50 1.53 1.30 1.32 
Aligned 1.50 1.53 1.30 1.32 
Others  1.20 1.25 1.04 1.08 
GJH 1.50 1.53 1.32 1.29 
H0: Self=Aligned, p-values 
Mann Whitney U Test/Permutation Test 0.2115/0.2277 0.2115/0.2201 0.2115/0.2277 0.2115/0.2209 
H0: Self=Others, p-values, 
Mann Whitney U Test/Permutation Test 0.0044/0.0144 0.0044/0.0130 0.0044/0.0136 0.0044/0.0130 
APPENDIX TABLE 4 ACCEPTANCE RATES OF THE DIFFERENT LOTTERIES IN THE LOTTERY CHOICE 
TASK AND IMPLIED 
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Appendix Table 5 shows results of simple OLS regressions for each of the four model 
benchmarks. As can be seen, the Others dummy is significant in all models while the Aligned 
dummy is not significant.
APPENDIX TABLE 5 ROBUST OLS REGRESSIONS WITH IMPLIED LOSS AVERSION PARAMETERS AS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE (Details on independent variables see Table 1) 
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Instructions and Screenshots 
First Page for each subject 
14 
Backside of instruction plus screenshot 
Self 
15 
Aligned 
16 
Others 
